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Abstract
What drives international migration? Theories of migration networks, migration culture,
migration systems and cumulative causation suggest that once a critical threshold level of
migrants have settled, migration tends to stimulate the creation of social and economic
structures that make the process of migration self-perpetuating (cf. Massey et al. 1987; de
Haas 2010). One important aspect of the theory is that the more migrants from a particular
locality settle in one place, their presence, assistance and established structures in the
destination country act as incentives for others to follow in their footsteps, which
emphasizes the instrumental role of pioneers’ agency in influencing others to follow suit. A
historical perspective on the migration from Ukraine to the United Kingdom and the
Netherlands challenges this assumption. While substantial numbers of migrants have settled
in those destinations, migration, especially in the last 20 years, has not developed into large,
self-sustaining migration systems (in comparison to the dynamic migration linkages between
Ukraine and Southern European countries such as Portugal, Italy and Greece). Trying to
understand why migration has not taken off, we argue that the role of settled pioneer
migrants and their community structures in assisting others to follow in their footsteps
should not be taken for granted. We argue that the role of pioneers is much more
ambiguous and complex, and the relevant question about ‘bridgeheads’ and ‘gatekeepers’
(cf. Böcker 1994) should not be that of ‘either/or’ but ‘how much’, ‘to what extent’ or
‘under what conditions’.
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The role of settled migrants influencing others to follow in their footsteps is considered to
be an important explanation for continuing and sustaining migration processes (Boyd 1989;
Massey et al. 1987). Migration network literature suggests that once a critical threshold
level of migrants has settled, their presence and assistance in the destination country tends
to stimulate the creation of social and economic structures that make the process of
migration self-perpetuating (de Haas 2010; Massey and Espinosa 1997). The role of settled
or ‘first’ migrants can be traced back to social adaptation studies that examined the effects
of massive population shifts after the Second World War, arguing that migrants managed in
the cities by adapting the support systems that aided them in their rural hometowns (cf.
Krissman 2005: 8; Gurak and Caces 1992: 153). However, other studies on migrant
networks have shown that sometimes settled migrants and migrant organizations function
as ‘gatekeepers’ instead, discouraging others to follow suit (Böcker 1994; Mahler 1995;
Garapich 2006; Eckstein 2009).This evolved into the debate about the ‘agency’ of pioneer
migrants in organizing communities, establishing community structures and helping others
to move and adapt to the new environment.
A historical perspective on the migration from Ukraine to the United Kingdom and the
Netherlands casts new light on this theoretical debate. While substantial numbers of
Ukrainian migrants have settled in these destinations, migration – especially in the past 20
years – has not developed into large, self-sustaining migration systems in comparison to the
sudden and dynamic migration linkages between Ukraine and Southern European countries
such as Portugal, Italy and Greece. While structural factors attached either to the
destination (tightening migration policies, different economic cycles) or to the origin context
(Cipko 2006; Malynovska 2007) might partly account for these differences, it is also
important to investigate the relationship between the settled and newcomer migrants and
to examine the role of pioneers in influencing others to follow suit.
Trying to understand why migration from Ukraine to the United Kingdom and
Netherlands has not taken off, we argue that the role of settled pioneer migrants and their
community structures as ‘bridgeheads’ (Böcker 1994) should not be taken for granted.
Based on our insights into Ukrainian migration patterns we learned that the role of pioneers
is more ambiguous and complex. Inter-wave relations among ‘old’ and ‘recent’ migrants are
often fragmented with internal tensions, distrust and ample opportunities for migrants to
exploit each other. Sometimes pioneers indeed played an important role in encouraging
others to come, but at other times they acted as strong gatekeepers of the community. In
this paper we attempt to re-conceptualize and nuance the role of pioneer migrants. We
develop a contextualized interpretation of the agency employed by pioneer migrants and
their organizations for subsequent migratory movements.
Reviewing the scarce and rather fragmented literature on the relationship between
different ‘waves’ of migrants and the consequences for setting in motion migration
processes, we set the premises for the analysis (Bakewell et al. 2011). After having
introduced our data and methods, we nuance and contextualize the role of pioneer
migrants in influencing subsequent movements. We pay attention to the agency of pioneers
in establishing network structures, which results in a certain relationship of power between
the settled and newcomer migrants. We argue that in order to understand the role of
settled migrants for subsequent movements it is important to pay more attention to the5
differences between migrant waves, where cultural and class divisions often occur. We
conclude that in order to understand the migration dynamics and the role of agency,
pioneer migrants should not be viewed solely as ‘bridgeheads’ or ‘gatekeepers’ but as a
combination of both.
2 Conceptualizing agency: beyond pioneers as bridgeheads or
gatekeepers
The definition of a ‘pioneer’ according to the Oxford Dictionary is ‘one of the first people to
go to a particular area in order to live and work there’ (Oxford Dictionary Online).
1 The
traditional approach to pioneer migration sees pioneers as the initial ‘movers’, who left their
country and community of origin (or current dwelling) and went to a different country,
where none of the members of their community had been before. Because pioneer
migration involves high costs and risks, pioneer migrants are often characterized as
innovators and risk-takers (Lindstrom and López Ramírez 2010: 55; de Haas 2010: 1599).
They are considered to be crucial nodes in migration networks. By setting an example and
facilitating social structures and support, pioneers can affect the migration aspirations and
behaviours of potential followers. They are the ones who ‘pave the way’, and create the
opportunities for other members of their community to follow in their footsteps.
This conceptualization already attributes pioneer migrants with a certain degree of
agency. To be an agent means to be capable of exerting some degree of control over the
social relations in which one is enmeshed, which, in turn, implies the ability to transform
those social relations to some degree (Sewell 1992: 20). Emirbayer and Mische (1998) offer
a sophisticated theorization of agency, which we adapted to nuance our understanding of
pioneers in influencing further migration movements. The agency is conceptualized at three
levels: habitual, projective and practical-evaluative. Agency is defined as ‘the temporally
constructed engagement by actors of different structural environments which, through the
interplay of habit, imagination, and judgement, both reproduces and transforms those
structures in interactive response to the problems posed by changing historical situations
(Emirbayer and Mische 1998: 970).
Massey et al. (1987) described the performance of agency by established pioneers as
decisive in encouraging others to migrate. In Return to Aztlán they demonstrated how
networks based on kinship, friendship, or a sense of common community of origin
(paisaneje) gave rise to the social organization of migration, which eventually led to the self-
perpetuation of migration. A similar understanding of pioneer agency, as directly inspiring
subsequent migration, stems from Faist’s (2000) research on Turkish migrants in Germany.
During the 1960s, pioneer migrants – acting as brokers in their villages of origin during
vacations – nominated future migrants, mostly activating their kinship ties if they came from
the villages in rural areas, or encouraging ‘stepwise migrants’ – people who had earlier
migrated from villages into big Turkish cities to move on to Germany (Faist 2000: 174). In
her study of two Anatolian villages Engelbrektsson (1978) revealed how pioneer migrants to
Sweden provided the travel money or sponsored ‘tourist’ trips abroad; other mechanisms
included family reunification and marriage arrangements with Swedish women or obtaining
an employer’s certification (Engelbrektsson 1978). Fellow villagers both abroad and at home
1 http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/pioneer?rskey=lniikg&result=26
were willing and felt a moral duty to grant practical assistance to those who opted for
emigration.
Previous migration experience and the settlement of migrants at particular places of
destination were therefore known to facilitate or even predict the arrival of new migrants
(Delechat 2002; Stark and Wang 2002). Social capital embedded within networks of
relatives, friends, or even merely co-nationals and more institutionalized social structures in
the destination reduced the costs and risks of migration. This increased the likelihood of
setting in motion migration dynamics independent of their initial conditions (Bashi 2007;
Curran et al. 2005; Curran and Rivero-Feuntes 2003; Garip 2008; Massey and Espinosa 1997;
Palloni et al. 2001). The pioneer migrants’ agency accounted for the stimulating effect on
further migration processes, par excellence. They were portrayed as functionally and
instrumentally embedded within an established migration system. Their main role was to
pave the way and make it easier for newcomers to follow. Their role as catalysts for further
migration was taken for granted.
However, settled migrants might also employ their agency in other ways. The prior
migrant might not always fulfil the obligations and the expectations of those ‘left behind’;
they may not agree to provide help when asked, and even when they do they might not
extend as much help as they are capable of providing. For instance, ‘migration assistance
can be withheld when established immigrants have limited resources or when they do not
see the arrival of more immigrants as beneficial’ (Bakewell et al. 2011). The empirical
research on migrant networks does not provide direct measures of the type and quantity of
migration assistance provided (Paul 2011). The idea of pioneers reorienting themselves
while abroad has been relatively less explored (Faist 2000: 127). Settled migrants acting as
gatekeepers is not a new phenomenon, yet it has been used in comparatively few studies,
and therefore its employment has been much more fragmented than it is in research on
how migrants employ their agency to assist others to follow.
Böcker (1994) introduced the concept of ‘gatekeepers’ to denote the possible negative
consequences of pioneer agency for further migration in the context of marriage migration
to the Netherlands. Böcker looked at the family politics of Turkish migrants and their close
and distant relatives back in Turkey. In the 1990s when economic conditions worsened,
unemployment increased dramatically among settled Turkish migrants in the Netherlands
and the Dutch government introduced new restrictions for legal immigration. The settled
Turkish migrants responded to these changes by resisting the pressures of family back home
and refusing to assist ‘yet another brother-in-law’ to come to the Netherlands. Some
offered vague promises of ‘arranging something’, while others reduced their contact with
relatives back home to a minimum (Böcker 1994: 97).
While Böcker’s ethnography is rich, she has not attempted to understand or theorize
the reasons behind settled migrants acting as gatekeepers beyond the changing socio-
economic characteristics of the receiving context. There is a lack of understanding about
what this gatekeeping role meant in terms of the agency of settled migrants. It was
assumed, along the lines of Massey et al. (1987), that mutual help, support and positive
social capital are expected of the relationship between settled and new migrants.
Gatekeeping is considered somewhat as an anomaly, ‘forced’ upon settled migrants by the
restrictive admission conditions in the receiving country. We are left with the question:
could there be other reasons for the pioneers not encouraging others to follow or cutting
their ties with the origin country?7
Eckstein (2009) offers a more exhaustive account by looking at inter-wave dynamics
between settled and recent Cuban migrants in California. The settled diaspora of pioneers
was comprised of emigrants who left Cuba between 1959 and 1979 and were mainly of
upper- and middle-class origins. They left Cuba because of the revolution, which stripped
them of property and privileges and left some fearful for their lives. Because of the
conditions under which they left, they viewed themselves as political exiles. By contrast,
Cubans emigrating in 1980 and thereafter were more likely to be of a working-class
background, and they more typically moved to the US for economic reasons to improve
their material well-being. The pioneers did not look forward to the arrival of the
newcomers, as they came from a different world – with the imprint of the Castro regime.
Eckstein paints a picture of rather hostile inter-community dynamics, where the settled
diaspora snubbed the new arrivals, whom they considered their social inferiors. As a result
Eckstein challenges the methodologically nationalistic position that immigrants from the
same home country could best be understood as a homogeneous group of foreign-borns
(ibid.). While hostility towards the post-1980s wave of immigrants tapered off over the
years, to date post-1980s and earlier immigrants socialize little with each other. Cross-
cohort family ties are limited, and most active participants in municipio (community-of-
origin) Cuban-American professional and other groups are first wavers. Moreover these two
waves typically live in different neighbourhoods in Miami. In short, Eckstein explains
negative inter-wave dynamics by differential circumstances, motives and strategies by
which migrants arrived in the destinations.
Sarah Mahler’s (1995) American Dreaming also demonstrated the dark side of the
relationship between established migrants and newcomers: abundant levels of negative
social capital and a number of socio-economic abuses that circulate within migration
networks. Mahler’s most important contribution is an overdue discussion of the bitter
surprise of many new migrants when they discover that assistance from the settled migrants
– even when provided by close relatives – is often available only if cash or other assets (such
as poorly remunerated labour) can be obtained from the recipients (ibid.). These
experiences of gatekeeping are often internalized by maltreated newcomers to the
detriment of subsequent migrants who in turn seek assistance from them; the maltreated
newcomers tend to ‘pass on’ their adaptation experience and notably act as impediments to
further migration.
Cultural heterogeneity and political frictions in immigrant waves have also been
examined by Garapich (2006) in relation to the Polish community in the United Kingdom.
Here there is, on the one hand, the established, highly institutionalized and organized
group, which used the symbolic power of the Second World War veteran and political
refugee status; and on the other hand the new post-2004 migrants who brought a different
set of cultural values and attitudes and thereby challenged the power of the established
diaspora. Garapich used this situation to offer insights into contemporary issues of civic
participation, inclusion and integration of migrants in the host society (ibid.: 152). We have
not seen, however, whether (and how) these inter-wave community power relations impact
migration processes: setting in motion self-perpetuating dynamics, encouraging other flows
or gatekeeping. The agency of pioneer or settled migrants in setting in motion further
migration dynamics has not been explicitly articulated, and could only be inferred indirectly
from observing intra-community power relations in the processes of adaptation into the
host society.8
One cannot help but notice that in the above perspectives the agency of pioneer
migrants has been treated either as encouraging or preventing others to follow. As a result,
while studying migration processes in the context of the relationship between settled and
newcomer migrants, we are very often limited by the implicit dichotomy of assistance or
network-related explanations: symmetrical – asymmetrical networks, full assistance or no
help, mobilization or non-mobilization of social capital. In the search for comprehensive
explanations, beyond simplistic dichotomies, we approached our empirical material with
questions about which of these strategies prevail, when, and under what conditions? We
looked at settled migrants’ agency as constituted not by mutually exclusive choices but
rather on a scale with different shades of grey, with complex, often contradictory accounts.
The development of the Ukrainian communities in the UK and the Netherlands gives rich
insight in the response of the post-1945 diaspora toward Ukrainian newcomers after 1991,
the reasons for this and the consequences it had for subsequent migration movements.
3 Data and methods
This paper is based on fieldwork among Ukrainian migrants in Amsterdam and Rotterdam
and in the Greater London area conducted under the auspices of the THEMIS project.
2 We
utilize data resulting from eight months of fieldwork and stemming from over 70 in-depth
interviews with migrants, representatives of migrant organizations and key stakeholders in
Ukrainian migration to Netherlands and the UK, as well as a literature study. Each interview
lasted between 1 and 1.5 hours; they were conducted in Russian or Ukrainian, and then
transcribed and translated into English. In the empirical part of the paper we particularly
draw on the section of the interviews relating to recent migrants’ relationship with the
settled, ‘established’ migrants, their knowledge and use of existing institutions, and the role
of migrant networks in migration processes.
While the history of the Ukrainian communities in the Netherlands and the UK
respectively goes back centuries, in order to explore meaningfully the relationship between
settled and newcomer migrants we limit ourselves to the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries. Our ethnographic approach enabled us to gather information from those who are
still alive and remember how the relationship between the settled migrants and newcomers
has developed over the years. We have discovered two substantive and largely distinct
waves of Ukrainian migrants. For the Netherlands and the UK we called them heuristically –
adhering to chronological order ¬ the ‘post-1945 wave’ and the ‘post-1991 wave’ (used
interchangeably with ‘post-WWII’ and ‘post-Independence’ waves).
3
2 THEMIS – ‘Theorizing the Evolution of European Migration Systems’ – is a comparative research project that
aims to address the gaps in contemporary theory on migration processes. It asks under what conditions initial
moves of pioneer migrants result in establishing migration systems and when this does not happen. Although
THEMIS looks into diverse migrant populations – trends of migration patterns among Brazilians, Moroccans
and Ukrainians in Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal and the UK – this paper focuses on Ukrainian migration,
taking a comparative perspective on the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
3 We would want to distance ourselves from the discourses of ‘tidal waves’ of migrants ‘flooding’ Europe. On
the contrary, we see a ‘wave’ of migration as a heuristic and analytical device to challenge the
methodologically nationalistic position that immigrants from the same origin country could best be
understood as a homogeneous group of foreign-borns (Eckstein 2009). By distinguishing ‘waves’ along
different variables such as time of arrival or aim of migration we contribute to nuancing the picture of bilateral
migratory movements.9
4 Post-1945 pioneer migrants and community formation in the UK
and the Netherlands
The Netherlands and the United Kingdom have never been traditional centres for Ukrainian
settlement. Studies indicate that earlier migration from Ukraine to the UK and the
Netherlands took place in the seventeenth century when young Ukrainians came to study at
institutions of higher education (Kohut 1994; Kravets 2011). Two centuries later, during the
eventful final decades of the nineteenth century and first decades of the twentieth century,
economic refugees as well as political refugees ended up in the United Kingdom and the
Netherlands. Although exact numbers remain unclear, it probably concerns several hundred
in both destination countries. In contrast, many more Ukrainian migrants treated the UK
and the Netherlands as stepping stones on their way to Canada and the US. Those who
stayed, settled in the Manchester area of the UK and the Low Countries (the Netherlands
and Belgium), never boarding the clipper to the other side of the Atlantic Ocean.
The foundations for the current population of Ukrainians in the Netherlands and the
UK were laid in the 1940s. It is important to distinguish what forms of adaptations and
community formation could be observed among Ukrainians, as the ways in which these
pioneer migrants responded to the conditions of life in the respective ‘host countries’ bear
important consequences for further migration movements.
During the Second World War, Dutch men were employed in Germany. Young women
from the conquered areas of the Soviet Republic were employed in Germany as
‘Ostarbeiterinnen’. A large share of those women came from the Ukrainian S.S.R. as this
region was the first to be conquered by the advancing German armies. Although contact
between people of the Slavic and Germanic ‘races’ was prohibited, approximately 4000
Dutch men brought back Russian/Ukrainian partners to the Netherlands after the war.
Ukrainian women who met their Dutch partners in Germany during the Second World War,
originated from different regions in Ukraine. In the Netherlands, most of them ended up in
the Randstad region: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Den Haag and Breda.
A number of men also migrated to the Netherlands. They were displaced persons who
after the war found themselves in various camps throughout continental Europe and did not
want to return to the Stalinist regime in Ukraine. In the Netherlands, most of them were
employed in the textile industry in the province of Overijssel: in the municipalities of
Enschede and Hengelo (Key informant, 2010). One of them explains:
After the war, I stayed in a camp for displaced persons. I wanted to stay in the
West. I preferred to go to Canada but that did not happen. In 1947 I was in the
Netherlands and I found a job in mechanics in Hengelo so I stayed.’ [R, Male, 87,
NL].
The numbers for the UK are more significant, as we can talk of a population of 33,000–
36,000 people (Kravets 2011) arriving in the aftermath of the Second World War, consisting
of three major groups. The first group formed part of the Second Polish Corps in which they
were serving. The second group of some 8,500 people were former soldiers of the Galicia
Division, who at the end of the war had surrendered to the British army and were then
interned in Italy, and finally transferred to the UK. The largest group of approximately
21,000 Ukrainians were recruited from displaced persons (DP) camps in continental Europe,
mainly in Germany and Austria, and came to the UK as part of the European Volunteer10
Workers (EVW) scheme (Kay and Miles 1988; Kravets 2011). Most of the immigrants
originated from Western Ukraine which was under Polish, Romanian and Czechoslovak rule
before the war. A few others came from pre-war Soviet Ukraine. Subsequently the EVWs
were allowed to invite close relatives to join them from the DP camps, and by the end of
1950 the Ukrainian EVWs were joined by around a thousand adult and minor dependants
(mainly spouses, parents and children born in DP camps).
In the Netherlands the post-war Ukrainian pioneers did not form a tightly knit
community (Kohu, 1994). As most of the Ukrainian pioneers were women who married
Dutch men, they did not stay in close neighbourhoods where they could mingle – they
joined Dutch families dispersed all over different cities. In line with cultural expectations at
that time they adopted Dutch last names. They lost most of their possessions and legal
papers in the war. Voluntarily or not, they had to assimilate quickly into Dutch society. The
social expectation of a woman at that time was to look after the house, so Ukrainian women
were supposed to spend most of their time at home and take care of their families. They do
not all share fond memories of their relationships with Dutch families:
The family was very distant. They weren’t very friendly to me. They were cold,
warmthless Dutch people. There must have been many girls who ended up a lot
worse than me. Some of them were expelled and had to live on the streets. But
to me they were friendly. They all spoke a little German. But I never felt any
warm feelings from their part. Never. I tried to imitate everything. I noticed that
Dutch women would clean the windows and the outside of the house every
Friday. In Ukraine, people would do this only twice a year. Although I didn’t
consider it necessary, I just did the same. I did everything I could to adjust. I was
already worried about not speaking Dutch and wanted to fit in with everything
else. I learned a lot from my mother in law.’ [O, Female, 87, NL]
These women had to learn to speak Dutch quickly because it was not acceptable to use
German which they had learned during the war:
I learned the Dutch language by imitation. Being laughed at or distrusted
because I was speaking German motivated me to learn to speak Dutch. [O,
Female, 87,NL]
Another reason for the quick assimilation of the Ukrainian pioneers and their lack of social
organization was the elaborate repatriation activities of the Soviet Regime until the
beginning of the 1950s along with Khruschev’s thaw. Although this repatriation was
supposed to be voluntary, many Ukrainians felt pressured to return. Those Ukrainian
pioneers who stayed back in the Netherlands organized themselves informally. In this way
they could support each other and live out their cultural habits. They did not engage or
organize politically. Through their actions they reconstructed Ukraine how they
remembered it, and to the extent allowed by the structural conditions encountered in the
Netherlands. As their Ukrainian roots were often a disadvantage in finding a job or relating
to Dutch people, the women found it necessary to assimilate and limit their identity to
folkloristic, often nostalgic expressions of Ukraineness:
I knew one and they knew others and that way we came together often with
several families. We made Russian borshch and wodka and we drank and danced
and sang. We were always busy. That is how Kalinka [Folklore group in
Rotterdam, RD] came into being. [O2, Female, 86, NL]11
These folklore dance, drama and singing groups existed in Rotterdam (Rodina/Kalinka), The
Hague (Droesjba), Amsterdam (Loena/Otchizna), Groningen (Lev Tolstoj/Sjewtsjenko) and
Hengelo (Roesalka). Alongside these associations registered by the Russian embassy,
informal gatherings took place. Ukrainian pioneers were welcomed in the Russian Orthodox
Church that has existed in the Netherlands since 1763 (Kalinka 2004). Ukrainian social
organizations were based on cultural enactments of folkloric dancing and singing. They were
initially oriented towards Ukraine as the pioneers knew and remembered it. The
organizations preserved the imagined Ukrainian homeland and culture, while in their daily
lives the pioneers had to reinvent themselves as Dutch wives and citizens. As pioneer
migrants’ ties with the origin country were cut off by the new world order, they adapted
and contextualized their actions to the degree allowed by the challenges and uncertainties
of social life abroad.
In the UK on the other hand, while the structural conditions of the host country’s
environment might not have been too favourable,
4 the numbers of Ukrainians were
greater, their gender balance was different than in the Netherlands, and upon arrival they
were clustered together in temporary displaced persons camps. This configuration of factors
created opportunities for different forms of adaptations and broader articulations of
Ukrainian migrants’ identity, beyond the folkloristic expressions. And indeed, the processes
of social organization of the Ukrainian community in the UK proceeded at a rapid pace.
Ukrainians who left continental Europe and settled in England maintained strong Ukrainian
national consciousness and remained largely inward-looking and origin-oriented, becoming
preservers of Ukrainian identity. In the camps, they established educational programmes,
choirs, folk dance groups, drama groups and even orchestras. In 1946 the Association of
Ukrainians in Great Britain was established; the key principle of the Association was mutual
support and assistance as the vast majority of Ukrainian settlers had no family – the
community became an extended family for them (Kravets 2011). Ukrayinska Dumka was
first published in 1945 and is still the only Ukrainian-language newspaper in the UK.
Migration and displacement enabled the Ukrainian émigrés in the UK to reconstruct
and build upon their traditions in accordance with evolving desires and purposes – ‘to
organize ourselves in this land’ (Emirbayer and Mische 1998: 984). As Ukrainians left the
camps and settled in industrial towns and cities all over the country, they began to establish
churches (e.g. the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in Duke Street, London), Ukrainian
Saturday schools and community centres (e.g. Ukrainian Social Club, Association of
Ukrainian Women) so that they could maintain their cultural and religious habits, and pass
these on to their children (Kravets 2011). The main role of the established organizations
allowed the sustaining of identities, commonly developed meanings and interactions that
were familiar to their members and widely practised when still ‘at home’:
We protected all our cultural achievements, and tried to show it all to the
Englishman, we tried to find our own place in the English world, a place for us as
Ukrainians. [I, female, 91, UK]
Basically their aim was to keep people together, so they don't disappear from
the face of the Earth. Or probably in less dramatic terms... But the main idea was
‘your own goes to your own for their own’. [O, male, 41, UK]
4 Cf. works on institutional racism of the immigration system in the UK (Gibney and Hansen 2005).12
Both diasporas – Ukrainians in the Netherlands and in the United Kingdom – adapted to the
conditions encountered in the destination countries. In the Dutch case the sometimes
voluntary, sometimes forced assimilation experienced by the Ukrainian women who
followed their partners from the labour camps under Cold-War conditions, resulted in
‘cutting off’ the ties with the origin community and negative consequences for further
migration dynamics. These accounts of extremely limited contacts with Ukraine and
subsequent movements between the 1950s and 1980s were consistent with the narratives
of our Ukrainian respondents in the UK. The specific configuration of adaptation and inward
community-oriented agency among the Ukrainians in the UK was conducive to sustaining
identities, meanings and institutions over time. Nevertheless, due to the limited
transnational connections this form of adaptation resulted more in an emergence of
‘imagined Ukrainian’ community (Anderson 1991).
After Ukraine’s declaration of independence in 1991 and the dissolution of the USSR,
it became much easier to leave Ukraine, yet in the Netherlands it was no longer possible for
Ukrainians to apply for asylum. In the UK Ukrainians could claim asylum until 2002, when
the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 put Ukraine on the ‘safe country list’. For
the Ukrainian diaspora settled in the West, 1991 also marked the first family reunifications,
when they could finally travel to Ukraine and meet with their family members who had
stayed behind. The movement of Ukrainian families to the West in search of maternal and
paternal uncles and aunts in the UK also took place during that initial period.
Over the last three decades, family migration, migration of students, and economic
migration have been the main types of Ukrainian migration to the Netherlands and the UK.
Due to the largely irregular nature of the latter it is difficult to estimate the scale of
migration. In the Netherlands, by 2005 there were 5,600 Ukrainian migrants registered as
coming from the former Soviet Union (Chkalova et al. 2008: 23). Including the irregular
migration we might conclude that the total number of Ukrainians residing in the
Netherlands might be closer to 10,000. For the UK, estimates vary from 15,000 (APS 2008)
to 30,000. While the irregular population is difficult to identify, the movement of ‘legal’
Ukrainians remains low: between 1998 and 2007 a total of 6,350 Ukrainian citizens were
granted indefinite leave to remain in the UK (Kravets 2011).
5 Inter-wave community dynamics: post-1945 and post-1991
Ukrainians
How did the settled community organize itself and respond to the newcomers from Ukraine
after 1991? The simple answer would be ambiguously. The initial years after Ukrainian
independence and the dissolution of the Soviet Union were marked by euphoria which
consequently intensified movements between Ukraine and the UK. It was the time of family
reunions, either back in Ukraine or in the West. Brothers saw each other after many
decades, cousins met for the first time:
First people from the Ukraine started to come here. So it was a very exciting
time I must say. Extremely exciting! The early 90s was a time of great
expectations as you know. Brothers came here and it was very emotional. And
then the children of immigrants who had never been to the country of their
parents started to travel. So it was going both ways. And people started to marry
their friends who came to the Ukraine, or somehow arranged by the13
immigration community. But they wanted to marry Ukrainians. [O3, female, 54,
UK]
Many Ukrainians, particularly from Western Ukraine, came to the UK either because they
were invited by their family members or upon encountering letters or carefully preserved
snippets of family memories:
My relatives lived in the UK, those first immigrants. And, one day, we found a
letter. It was written on a very old, yellow, fragile-looking paper. It was written
in an old type of handwriting, Polish letters. We had to ‘translate’ it. My
grandma translated it because we couldn't understand everything. It was my
grandfather's own brother. He said he didn't want anything apart from coming
[to Ukraine] and visiting parents' graves, and to see his brother. There was only
one brother still alive there because all six of them migrated. [L, female, 37, UK]
The 1990s for Ukraine was also a decade of severe economic hardships (Aslund 2002); in the
aftermath of the USSR collapse people were losing their jobs, or their salaries were withheld
for months [L2, female, 56]. Not surprisingly therefore, for Ukrainians the ideas of coming to
the West and meeting distant relatives (where they existed) were usually combined with
livelihood strategies and predominantly focused on earning money and improving ones’
situation while abroad.
The migrants who had settled in the UK first very often acted as bridgeheads for these
temporary money-earning projects; they prepared official invitations and took it upon
themselves to be hosts to their family members:
My nieces were all eager to come here. They want me to send them an
invitation. I needed to fill in some documents, sign them and mail those. My
nieces have to go to the embassy and within a few days they will get a visa. Then
they can stay here for as long as they can pay. [O2, Female, 86, NL]
We helped a lot to those who arrived from Ukraine in the UK, I personally helped
many family members between 1991 and 1995/6. We used to organize their
lodging. [A, female, 78, UK]
Aside from help with immigration matters, offering accommodation and subsistence, the
settled migrants also used their contacts to arrange for jobs or temporary assignments –
house decorating, painting, small construction projects, domestic cleaning. Therefore, the
settled migrants significantly contributed to making the first money-earning projects
worthwhile and reinforcing them as a temporary survival strategy for many Western
Ukrainians in particular:
My friend used to live on the same street as I did, and she needed some
renovation work, some painting. She would not ask her sons to do it, as they
completed college, so she was taking those people, who came from Ukraine that
was cheaper. They spoke the same language as the people from the diaspora
who needed the job to be done. So this was how we helped. [A, female, 67, UK]
These moves, with the help or encouragement of settled migrants, were particularly intense
from around the early to mid 1990s. But then the general attitude towards the newcomers
from Ukraine changed rather significantly. After the years of initial euphoria surrounding
family reunification, the settled migrants felt that their duty towards fellow Ukrainians was14
– at least partially – completed, and that the constant trips, invitations, paying guests and
lodgers as part of everyday life were not sustainable in the future:
There was a huge wave of migration, the same as from Poland, even English
people [emphasis – authors] got overwhelmed. [A, female, 78, UK]
At the same time, however, the news of ‘quick’ money earned in the West reached Ukraine
and there were more and more people who wanted to follow suit. It was no longer a matter
of coming via family ties, visiting uncles or cousins, and earning some money ‘on the side’.
The subsequent movements became independent of the initial conditions that enabled it –
family reunifications. From the perspective of the diaspora, things started getting ‘out of
control’, the situation became overwhelming, and more often than not it was perceived and
interpreted as ‘morally wrong’ [M, male, 97]:
I also had experiences: ‘just make us an invitation, we won't bother you’. I said I
can't do this because I am a law abiding person. [O3, female, 54, UK]
The position of the settled migrants, the diaspora, regarding the newcomers from Ukraine
turned from bridgeheading towards gatekeeping:
I would prefer if they were there [in Ukraine]. [O, female, 76, UK]
I am not looking for other Ukrainian people because we have nothing in
common. They grew up in a very different time. They don’t know about the
thirties, about what I experienced in Ukraine. They are all gold diggers. Most of
them. [O, Female, 87, NL]
It was quite common for the migrants who arrived after 1991 to share the feeling that they
were not welcomed in England or in the Netherlands by the settled diaspora members.
Many of them shared experiences of their decision to come to the ‘West’ being regarded as
‘unpatriotic’ [M, male, 42, NL]:
I am generalizing a little but older generation were looking at us with suspicion
and quite a few of them made it clear that we should pack up and go home to
‘build Ukraine’. [T, male, 40, UK]
The more contact there was between the settled migrants and the newcomers the more
differences become visible, and seemingly, irreconcilable. There is no reason to believe that
political generational experiences are left behind when people emigrate. At the same time,
the generationally variable experiences forming part of the immigrant ‘baggage’ are cultural
and economic as well as political, and these experiences likewise influence the relationship
between historically distant ‘waves’ of migration.
6 The immigrant divide
With the arrival of Ukrainians from the independent Ukraine throughout the 1990s ‘the
community of Ukrainians in the UK’ (heuristically speaking) became much more diversified,
extending far beyond the small circle of Ukrainian nationalists from the West. In the
Netherlands it grew beyond the circle of largely assimilated Ukrainian women with Dutch
partners. It now incorporated people from Central and Eastern Ukraine, those who had
experienced Soviet rule, perhaps even those who supported it back then, or those for whom
Russian was their first language. The divisions became more substantial and cut across
several areas: cultural, generational and class. There were differences in identity politics,15
language, education, and opinions about the future of Ukraine, that came with varying
motives and circumstances of migration. This was often confirmed and expressed through
the images that different waves of Ukrainian migrants constructed of each other:
All the Ukrainian organizations became one big thing, called the diaspora, older
generation – with all their divisions inside. And then there was a new structure
which was new migrants. They call it in Ukrainian ‘Ukraincy’ [Ukrainians] – which
meant the diaspora, and ‘Ukraincy z Ukrainy’ [Ukrainians from Ukraine] – which
meant the new arrivals. [O, female, 27, UK]
The language division is the first aspect that underlines the cultural differences. In the UK it
took the form of symbolic imbalances of power over the use of ‘high’ and standardized
Ukrainian. The Ukrainian diaspora members repeatedly stressed that their language was
legitimate, its authenticity was additionally strengthened by the deep conviction that
‘Ukraine was Russified and taken away from us’ [J, female, 87, UK]; while the newly arrived
migrants spoke a version of Ukrainian that was arguably severely changed and Russified:
The diaspora would say that our Ukrainian is of slightly lower standard because
we introduce a lot of Russian words, and it is difficult to communicate, and thus
there is a language division, which is huge. [A, female, 27, UK]
In the Netherlands, on the contrary, many of the pioneers spoke Russian while migrants
from the newly arrived wave often expressed themselves in Ukrainian. This clearly marks a
division between the waves:
We spoke Russian, not Ukrainian because we grew up in the city, not in a village.
In the city, all people spoke Russian. The Russian language suits me better than
Ukrainian. Ukrainian is a bit coarse. It is a coarse language. I don’t know how to
explain. Russian is more distinguished, a light language. [O2, female, 86, NL]
The settled diaspora and the newcomers saw themselves as different from each other also
in terms of education; the newcomers were often acknowledged by the settled migrants to
have better education opportunities in the origin country and in the destination country –
both the UK and the Netherlands. Aside from Ukrainian, they usually speak English, Dutch,
Russian or Polish and find it easier to adapt themselves to the new society. The recognition
of the newcomers’ educational status often went hand in hand with regret that such
opportunities were unavailable to the ‘political migrants’ after the war:
Those who arrived now, they consider us very primitive. That we do not
understand many things… They all have now good education, normal education,
get their degrees acknowledged here, and they get the job – they work in
hospitals as doctors, for instance. But they also do not understand that people,
who arrived in this country after the war, it took them quite some time to stand
on their two feet. They were starting from zero. [I, female, 91, UK]
I meet a lot with my friends from Ukraine who have studied here, we
communicate regularly. But organizations – no, I think it is more for old people. I
also have a lot of Dutch friends now, and spend quite some time with them. [S,
Male, 28, NL]
The next line that divides the community is the socially constructed aim of or motive for
migration. It is apparent now in the context of the above reflections that the diaspora16
members conceive of themselves as political migrants (although a large proportion of its
members came to the UK as migrant workers under the European Volunteer Workers
scheme (Kay and Miles 1988; Kravets 2011)). This, above all, reveals the different
generational experiences of the two waves that are historically and contextually grounded
(cf. Eckstein 2009) with relation to Ukraine. The diaspora and – to a much lesser extent –
their children, morally driven by anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalism, sought to speak for all
Ukrainians in the UK or the Netherlands. This, in turn, inevitably resulted in a view of the
current economic motives as petty and less worthy; a view shared equally by the diaspora
and the newly arrived migrants themselves. In conversations with the settled migrants, the
newcomers saw that their rationale for migration was difficult to comprehend and often
despised:
The diaspora would normally say: ‘We are only here, because there was no
Ukraine to go back to. You are the ones who are leaving this wonderful and
independent country and that's not good, you are looking for money, whilst we
were looking for safety’. [A, female, 27, UK]
I rather hope not many people from Ukraine will migrate to the Netherlands.
They all want to live from social welfare. They are clever. We never received any
social welfare. Until now, now I receive a state pension. [ O2, Female, 86, NL]
For many settled migrants this new wave of Ukrainians came ‘from a different country’ [B,
male, 71]. The settled migrants, beyond family ties, became disinterested and disengaged
with keeping the movement going. On the contrary, they saw themselves as obliged not to
encourage this ‘mass migration’ from Ukraine, be it along the nationalistic lines – for the
future sake of Ukraine – or to preserve the integrity of their own community:
I went once to the pub of Ukrainians. And there was one dziadek [elderly
gentleman – authors], and he came to me and started saying: ‘What are you
doing here? Ukraine is such a picturesque country, why don’t you go back home
and help it rise on its legs. And help to rebuild it? What are you doing here? Go
back to Ukraine!’ [H, female, 28, UK]
As a result of these tensions, the newcomers of the 1990s did not dare to ask diaspora
members for help with migration. They confined themselves to their own networks of
friends, or institutionally embedded migration businesses. The recent migrants did not feel
the need to affiliate with diaspora organizations such as the folklore groups. They had
different expectations and different needs that for a long time could not be met by the
plethora of existing community structures, as they developed without a ‘real’ link to Ukraine
and its current problems:
I don’t really feel a need [to participate in Ukrainian organizations – authors]. I
don’t have any particular patriotic feelings. I don’t feel in my blood that I am
Ukrainian. But I am also not that Russian, because I grew up in Ukraine. I can be
seen as a patriot in a sense that I am Russian, Slavic, in my mentality. But to say
that I want to link back, no. For me the church is enough. In the choir there are a
lot people from Kalinka and that’s really my link. But to join more, to be honest I
don’t even have that much time. Maybe I am just not interested enough, or in
the future, when I am an old grandmother. I don’t know, maybe. [A, Female, 26,
NL]17
It's the expectations of people who just came and [that of the members of]
associations and the job they were doing. They were not necessarily matching
each other. And that obviously creates tensions and a lot of people
misunderstood the organizations and what they do. [W, male, 43, UK]
Institutions created or attended by the post-1991 migrants seem to be of a more
instrumental or practical nature and less for socializing or ‘living out’ Ukrainian folklore and
culture:
To be honest, I am not involved in any kind of organizations concerning Ukraine
or Russian speaking people – I do have a group on Facebook with Russian
speaking society with Ukrainian and Russian people – in the Netherlands. You
can get addresses of Russian shops, you have news about events coming up,
about their experiences which is very important to know. People pretty much
move with the same background. But you cannot say that it is an official society.
It is just a group on Facebook but it is useful. [V, Male, 21, NL]
All in all, recent Ukrainian migrants observe that there is not much communality among
those who arrived in the post-1991 wave:
Ukrainians are not keeping together; there are no strong bonds and
connections. They spread around and assimilate fast. [O, Female, 31, NL]
As a result, from the mid 1990s we can actually observe two different Ukrainian
communities in the UK and the Netherlands: the old diaspora with its own institutions and
organizations, and the new migrants whose networks were of a rather informal character.
Contacts between these two waves are sporadic or take place on other territory – such as
the church. As a result, these two waves started growing apart from each other. If settled
migrants did offer help and acceptance, one could hypothesize that this would reinforce the
migration dynamics or perhaps even give rise to more intensified migration. The reality
proved on the contrary to be that of lack of support or acceptance which hindered the
newcomers’ adaptation and was not conducive to further migration.
The nature of social relationships between the post-1945 and post-1991 migrants
could be used to infer observations about the role of settled migrants in decelerating the
migration processes from Ukraine. We offer a proposition that a configuration of different
structural factors in interplay with elements of settled migrants’ agency resulted in the
rather stagnant nature of migration dynamics. The ‘old’ diaspora institutions being
‘overwhelmed’ by the new arrivals distanced themselves from the fact that the Ukrainian
community in the UK and in the Netherlands became more and more diverse. Instead, they
remained inward-looking and limited social events to their ‘own’ circle of people. Their
community structures and institutions remained closed to the matters and experiences of
contemporary Ukrainians for many years. The settled migrants’ attitude towards the
newcomers was one of distrust, as they arguably came from different world – one with the
experience of socialist regime. Additionally, for at least two decades we saw a lack of new
institutions and organizations, called to life by more recent Ukrainian migrants, which could
directly respond to their needs of post-arrival adaptation, thereby failing to fill in the void
resulting from lack of support from the established diaspora.
7 Conclusions18
This paper argues that when studying settled migrants’ agency regarding newcomers, the
relevant question about ‘bridgeheads’ and ‘gatekeepers’ should not be one of ‘either/or’
but of ‘how much?’, ‘to what extent?’ or ‘under what conditions?’ The case of Ukrainian
migration to the UK and the Netherlands shows that settled migrants employ their agency
not exclusively in a way that encourages or discourages subsequent migration. We should
see settled migrants’ agency not as a dichotomy but rather on a scale with different shades
of grey, with complex, often contradictory accounts, which tend to change over time.
By contextualizing the situations in which different types of agency were employed,
we found that bridgeheading is more likely to occur in a situation where new opportunities
for migration of close friends and family members come along. Gatekeeping, on the other
hand, happens when the division lines between the settled and newly arrived waves of
migrants become prominent. In this case, cultural, generational and socio-economic and
class differences in interplay with settled migrants’ capacity and willingness to act stopped
diaspora members from assisting and welcoming the newly arrived migrants. These
differences could also explain why the newly arrived migrants did not join the pre-existing
social and community structures established by the diaspora, but rather confined
themselves to informal arrangements that cut across ethnic divisions. This led to two
Ukrainian communities living next to each other, side by side, for over 20 years and resulted
in specific consequences for further migratory movements.
In explaining the continuation of migration from the network perspective, one should
take into account the complex and differentiated inter-wave dynamics in which the agency
of pioneer migrants encouraging subsequent movement should not be taken for granted
(Massey et al. 1987; Faist 2000). The focus on the agency of settled migrants as captured
through their behaviour and attitudes towards newcomers helps to answer some crucial
questions: whether community institutions are open or closed to newcomers, how migrants
from different waves perceive each other, and what was the evolving nature of their social
relationships.
If we are to understand immigrants’ role regarding others following in their footsteps,
we have to bear in mind the complex cultural, generational, and socio-economic differences
between migrant cohorts. We need to examine how the perception of their co-nationals is
produced and consumed and then draw out its social implications, such as what meaning
people attach to others following them, what expectations they have, and how they
perceive each other in everyday life.19
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